The key objective of this study, on the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), is to develop a proposal for the establishment of an “EU capital markets single supervisory mechanism” (CM-SSM) – like the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the banking sector, in which this EU agency would have both direct supervisory tasks and an “oversight function” for that mechanism. The proposal goes beyond the current “targeted centralisation model”, whereby supervisory tasks have been conferred upon the ESMA on a selective basis. On the other hand, it is also different from a “fully centralised model”, whereby the ESMA would become the sole EU capital markets supervisor, i.e., for all financial market participants across Member States.
To reinforce the rationale for this proposal, and put it in the context of the gradual evolution of the ESMA (since 2011) and the current discussions on the development of the Savings and Investments Union (SIU) with two legs (namely, the Capital Markets Union (CMU) and the Banking Union (BU)), the study is structured in two Chapter containing five Sections:
Chapter 1 (titled “The status quo”) contains three Sections:
Section A (“Foundations”) develops on the establishment of the ESMA, its role as an agency, its objective, tasks and powers of the ESMA under the initial provisions of its founding Regulation (ESMAR), its independence, accountability and transparency, ant is liability, as well as the quasi-judicial and judicial review of its Decisions. The following Section B (“Gradual enhancement of tasks and powers through amendments of the ESMAR”) mainly deals with the most significant amendments to ESMAR in 2019 by Regulation (EU) 2019/2175. The last Section in this Chapter, Section C (“The evolution of the ESMA in terms of its temporary intervention and direct supervisory tasks”), presents, in turn, the ESMA’s temporary intervention powers under Article 9(5) ESMAR and the gradual evolution of its direct supervisory tasks from 2011 up to date.
Chapter 2 (titled “Current developments and proposals on the way forward”) is structured in two Sections:
Section D (“Proposals under the evolving Savings and Investments Union (SIU) strategy”), discusses the Draghi Report, the Commission’s Communication of 19 March 2025 and the follow-up “market integration and supervision package” (MISP), then develops on the Commission proposals under the MISP in relation to the ESMA, and finally contains some remarks on a seemingly “uncompleted agenda” in relation to the CMU-related leg of the SIU – including on removing barriers to capital movements – and on the BU-related leg of the SIU. 
The author’s concrete proposal on the establishment of the “EU capital markets single supervisory mechanism” (CM-SSM) is developed in the final Section E (“A proposal for the transformation of the ESMA into a “genuine” supervisory authority within a structured EU capital markets “supervisory mechanism”). This discusses the different models of centralisation in capital markets supervision,  the inclusion of the ESMA and the Member States national competent authorities (NCAs) into the CM-SSM, the supervisory perimeter issue, amendments relating to governance and funding arrangements, the case for further maximum harmonisation in EU capital markets law and the need to eventually restructure the Board of Appeal (BoA). The author’s expectation is that the analysis in this Section fully substantiates his proposal to transform the ESMA into a “genuine” EU capital markets supervisor under the SIU project within an integrated Single Supervisory Mechanism. In a final note in Section E (under 5.3), the potential application of the twin peaks approach for the architecture EU financial supervision is also briefly discussed.
The documentation of the study is supported by references to relevant case-law of EU Courts and literature (albeit on a selective basis in certain cases). 

Read the entire article here: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7313578 or here: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7313578.