

MiFID 2 and the CMU: Are we there yet?

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CMU and **EBU**: coopetition

- CMU as an alternative to EBU

- Steps in when bank deleveraging may lead to credit crunch
- May support more innovative firms (the case of the US)



- CMU as a supporting factor for EBU

- Facilitating access to equity capital strengthens firm financial resilience
- Reducing barriers to cross-border investments reduces the impact of asymmetric shocks in the EMU
 - All the more important when other input factors do not move across the borders (workers; state budget) (the case of the US, again)

One project, many building blocks

- My focus: MiFID II/MiFIR (MiFID 2)
 - Crucial element at the centre of the regulatory stage
- But the whole context matters, of course:
 - Prospectuses
 - MAR
 - Transparency
 - Takeover bids
 - Venture capital
 - Company law (incl. start-ups)

MiFID II and CMU: three perspectives

1) Enhanced harmonization to foster integration

2) Retail investor protection

3) Market structure (trading industry)

CMU – material improvements

- Single Rule Book law in books:
 - Towards a complete system leveraging on Art 290 and 291 TFEU
 - Investment services: rules provide legal certainty; standards provide flexibility
 - Market structure: integrating many competing TVs share trading obligations; non-equity pre-trade info; governance of market data
- Good results in many areas:
 - SME-GM: a success story
 - Cases like Sweden show MiFID II (at least) does not prevent deep markets with retail participation and steady IPO flows



But not there, yet

Investment services and retail investors

- A lot in the MiFID II:
 - Refined suitability/appropriateness tests
 - Independent advice and rules on inducements
 - Product governance and intervention

More to come with RIS

- But uncertainties remain:
 - Sustainability preferences hard to define and combine with other classifications (Taxonomy, SFDR)
 - National interpretations on key matters, such as:
 - Selling financial instruments and best client's interest
 - PFOF persisting divergence on crucial issues such as inducements, CoI and best execution (ban on PFOF does not address these!)

Market structure

- 27 national stock exchanges for the 27 Member States
 - 15 exchange groups, but consolidation only for market operators
- Primary market:
 - Fragmentation reduces ability of each national market to become the gateway for:
 - Foreign issuers to tap local capitals
 - Foreign capitals to reach local issuers
- Secondary markets
 - CTP still missing (as opposed to US NMS): current attempts to reform

A preliminary matter: What fosters what?

- "Capital Markets" or "Union"?
 - Should we develop local markets before unifying them?
 - Or does integration facilitate the development of capital markets?
- History of late joiners (such as Italy):
 - Financial market integration facilitates development of local capital markets
- Size of market participants (and the liquidity they can provide) as a crucial element to develop capital markets in the peripheral areas, as well
 - Critical mass facilitates diversification



Where does the problem lie?



- Some differences among jurisdictions unlikely to disappear because of (i) national resistance or (ii) efficiency reasons
- Limited room remaining for improvement



- Can help manage differences that harmonisation (i) cannot or (ii) should not address
- A lot of room remaining for improvement

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Risk of conflicting interpretations (e.g. consumers)

Inv. serv. provider in Country A

- NCA, and its interp. of COBs
- Applicable public law

Free prov. consumer in Country B

- Court, and its interp. of COBs
- Applicable private law



Not to mention issues outside MiFID 2

- Contractual or tortious claim?
- Connecting factor(s) for tort?

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The invaluable role of ESMA

- Strengthening consistency within the CMU
 - Involvement through RTS, ITS (or technical advice)
 - Guidelines, recommendations, Q&A, peer review, information exchange, coordination groups
- Impact clearly visible in some key areas, such as:
 - New Guidelines on suitability requirements, to include sustainability preferences
 - Q&A on MiFID 2 market structure and transparency
 - Peer review on supervision of cross-border activities of investment firms (with ensuing recommendations)

Should we make ESMA a single supervisor?

- The European Banking Union (EBU) as a model? Not so fast:
 - Failed past attempts (e.g. EU AIF labels; certain prospectuses)
 - Towards multiple single authorities in the CMU?
 - Where conflict-of-law provisions allows selecting NCA
 - Would top-down centralisation of supervisory powers be efficient?
 - Broader role for private litigation in the CMU, compared to EBU? Divergence to remain in case law
- Fostering uniformity through negative integration (supervised freedom to choose home country) as an alternative or an intermediate stage
 - Determining applicable law and jurisdiction to facilitate concentration

Takeaways

- Harmonization as a crucial element of market integration, but with its limits
- National interpretations hampering cross-border services (especially for retail investors)
- Market structure for trading services remains fragmented (CTP to help retail investors)
- The role of enforcement

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